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DIRECTOR LIABILITY AND THE INSOLVENT, FEDERALLY
CHARTERED FINANCIAL INSTITUTION: A STANDARD
EMERGES
This Recent Development discusses the standard of liability for directors
and officers' of failed, federally chartered financial institutions. In
particular, it focuses on the effect the Financial Institution Reform,
Recovery and Enforcement Act (FIRREA)2 has on the standard of liability
when a federally chartered institution operates in a state which provides a
cause of action for simple negligence.3 Although federal regulators can sue
directors of state chartered institutions under state law standards,4
controversy exists over whether state law simple negligence standards apply
to directors of federally chartered institutions after FIRREA.
The Seventh Circuit recently addressed this issue in Resolution Trust
Corp. v. Chapman.5 A divided court concluded that, federal regulators
could not sue the directors of failed, federal institutions under state simple
negligence standards.6 Rather, the directors were held to the FIRREA's less
stringent gross negligence standard.7
Part I of this Recent Development discusses the corporate and legal
climate that prompted Congress to pass FIRREA. Part II examines the text
and history of FIRREA and cases interpreting the statute's liability
provisions. Part III analyzes the Chapman decision. Finally, this Recent
Development examines how Chapman frustrates congressional intent by
insulating directors of federally chartered institutions from liability and by
1. The remainder of this note will refer only to directors. Such references include officers as well.
2. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.A.).
3. This Recent Development is limited to discussing the propriety of applying state law standards
of liability to the directors of insolvent, federally chartered financial institutions. FIRREA authorizes
federal regulatory agencies to assert the claims of an institution against the institution's directors only
after the institution has been placed into receivership or conservatorship. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(A)
(Supp. V 1993). Therefore, the issues raised by director liability actions prior to insolvency are beyond
the scope of this Recent Development. Moreover, this Recent Development does not focus on the
application of state law standards to state chartered institutions. For a discussion of state law standards
and the state chartered institution, see Jon Shepard, Note, The Liability of Officers and Directors Under
the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, 90 MICH. L. Rsv. 1119
(1992).
4. See FDIC v. McSweeney, 976 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1440 (1993);
FDIC v. Canfield, 967 F.2d 443 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 113 S. Ct. 516 (1992).
5. 29 F.3d 1120 (7th Cir. 1994).
6. Id. at 1123.
7. Id.
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decreasing a state's power to regulate corporate activity within its borders.
I. DIRECTOR LIABILITY AND THE NEED FOR FEDERAL INTERVENTION
Courts reviewing the actions of directors of financial institutions rarely
impose personal liability on directors Rather, these directors fall under
the protection of the business judgement rule.' This rule arose out of a
concern for judicial competence in business affairs'" and the need for
directors to have the freedom to take risks in the interests of their
businesses.' Under the business judgement rule, courts are reluctant to
second guess management decisions.'2 Rather, courts have developed a
uniform standard of liability whereby, in the absence of a conflict of
interest transaction, 3 a director does not face personal liability for
management decisions unless grossly negligent in failing to gather all
relevant information before making a business decision.'4
8. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1982) ("A corporate officer who makes a mistake
in judgement as to economic conditions, consumer tastes or production line efficiency will rarely, if
ever, be found liable for damages suffered by the corporation.'), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983).
9. "The 'businessjudgment' rule sustains corporate transactions and immunizes management from
liability where the transaction is within the powers of the corporation (intra vires) and the authority of
management, and involves the exercise of due care and compliance with applicable fiduciary duties."
HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS § 242 (3d. ed. 1983). See also
American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance § 4.01 (1994) (stating suggested statutory
codification of the business judgment rule, with annotations).
10. See North, 692 F.2d at 886. The North court discussed the limitations of the judicial process
in areas of business, noting that: "[C]ourts recognize that after-the-fact litigation is a most imperfect
device to evaluate corporate business decisions. The circumstances surrounding a corporate decision are
not easily reconstructed in a courtroom years later, since business imperatives often call for quick
decisions, inevitably based on less than perfect information." Id.
11. In explaining the value of risk-taking by a corporate enterprise, the North court stated:
[B]ecause potential profit often corresponds to the potential risk, it is very much in the
interest of shareholders that the law not create incentives for overly cautious corporate
decisions. Some opportunities offer great profits at the risk of very substantial losses, while
the alternatives offer less risk of loss but also less potential profit.
Id.
12. See id. at 885-86.
13. When a director uses his corporate position to further personal rather than corporate interests,
the transaction is said to be a conflict of interest transaction violative of the director's fiduciary duty
of loyalty. See HmN & ALExANDER, supra note 9, § 238. The director may be held personally liable
to the corporation for any damages arising from the transaction. Id. This Recent Development is limited
in scope to the potential liability arising from a director's violation of the fiduciary duty of care.
14. Two prominent Delaware director liability cases illustrate the prevailing standard of care that
developed under the business judgement rule. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985)
("We think the concept of gross negligence is also the proper standard for determining whether a
business judgement reached by a board of directors was an informed one."); Aronson v. Lewis, 473
A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) ("While the Delaware cases use a variety of terms to describe the applicable
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Despite the apparent safe harbor that a gross negligence standard of
liability imparts, in Smith v. Van Gorkom5 the Delaware Supreme Court
indicated a willingness to find directors liable under this standard. 6 While
the facts in Van Gorkom arguably rose to the level of gross negligence in
light of the lack of information gathered by the board prior to approving
a major transaction,17 the decision nonetheless frightened directors and
caused states to reassess their approach to director liability. 8
Many states continue to hold directors to the standard of care that an
ordinarily prudent person would exercise in a similar situation. 9 The Van
Gorkom decision led many other states to enact statutes designed to reduce
or eliminate a director's risk of liability and to extend the protection the
Delaware Supreme Court appeared unwilling to offer.2" Although some
states provide that only intentional or reckless conduct will lead to liability,
others permit shareholders to entirely limit or eliminate a director's
personal liability.2 The states that shield directors beyond the protection
standard of care.... under the business judgement rule director liability is predicated upon concepts
of gross negligence").
15. 488 A.2d 858.
16. Id. at 893.
17. See id. at 874; see also Andrew G.T. Moore II, The 1980s-Did We Save the Stockholders
While the Corporation Burned?, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 277, 281 (1992). Justice Moore, who joined the
majority opinion in Van Gorkom, explains that the decision did not create new law. Rather, he notes,
the court applied "well-established principles to egregious facts.' Id. at 281.
18. See Stephen A. Radin, The Director's Duty of Care Three Years After Smith v. Van Gorkom,
39 HASTINGS L. J. 707, 709 (1988) (analyzing post-Van Gorkom decisions and state legislative efforts
to address director liability).
19. "Thirty-eight jurisdictions require that a director of a corporation discharge the duties of his
office [with]... the care that an ordinarily prudent person would exercise under similar circumstances."
2 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.30 annot. (3d ed. 1993) (statutory comparison); see, e.g., REV.
MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.30(a)(2) (1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-313(d) (West Supp. 1994);
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 450.1541a(l) (1993); MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-4-8.30 (Supp. 1994); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 21-2035 (1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293-A:8:30 (Supp. 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-8-
30(a) (1990).
20. See James J. Hanks, Jr., Evaluating Recent State Legislation on Director and Officer Liability
Limitation and Indemnification, 43 Bus. LAW. 1207, 1209-10 (1988) (noting that since the year the
Delaware Supreme Court decided Van Gorkom, more than forty states "have adopted some form of
legislation designed to reduce the risk of directors' personal liability for money damages.').
21. See Shephard, supra note 3, at 1120 n.7 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.210(1)(N) (1989));
Apiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-054(A)(9) (1990) (permitting shareholders to limit or eliminate director
liability); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-202(B)(3) (Michie Supp. 1991); CAL CORP. CODE § 204(a)(10)
(1990) (shareholder power to limit eliminate director liability); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-3-101(u) (Supp.
1991) (shareholder power to limit or eliminate liability); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp.
1991) (shareholder power to limit or eliminate director liability); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-202(b)(4)
(Michie 1989); HAW. REV. STAT. § 23-415-48.5 (Supp. 1991); IDAHO CODE § 30-1-54(2) (Supp. 1991);
IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(e) (West Supp. 1991) (precluding director liability unless conduct
19951 1479
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provided by the previously impenetrable gross negligence standard set the
stage for directors to act with presumed impunity.
This presumed impunity appeared most acute in the management of
America's financial institutions.' In addition to effectively being shielded
from liability by the statutes of several states, directors of financial
institutions enjoyed the added protection of federally insured operating
capital' and the simultaneous deregulation of the banking industry.24
"constitutes willful misconduct orrecklessness"); IoWA CODEANN. § 490.832 0Vest 1991); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 17-6002(b)(8) (1988); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.2-020(2)(d) (Michie 1989); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 12:24(c)(4) (West Supp. 1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 716 (West Supp. 1991); MD.
CORPS. & ASSNS. CODE ANN. § 2-405.2 (Supp. 1991); MASS, GEN. L. ch. 156B, § 13(b)(1) (1988);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.1209(c) (West 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251(4) (West Supp.
1992); NEB. REv. STAT. § 21-2035(2) (Supp. 1990); NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.037(1) (1991); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 293-A:54(I-a) (Supp. 1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:2-7(3) (West Supp. 1991); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 53-12-2(E) (Michie Supp. 1991); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 402(b) (McKinney Supp.
1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-2-02(b)(3) (1990); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1006(B)(7) (West Supp.
1992); OR. REv. STAT. § 60.047(2)(c) (1989); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.1-48(a)(6) (Supp. 1991); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 33-2-102(e) (Law. Co-op. 1990); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 47-2-58.8 (1991); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 48-12-102(b)(3) (Supp. 1991); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-7.06(B) (Vest Supp.
1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-49.1 (1991); WASH. REV. CODE § 23B.08.320 (1989); WiS. STAT.
ANN. § 180.0828 (West Supp. 1991); WYO. STAT. § 17-16-834 (1989)); see also OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 1701.59(D) (Anderson 1992) (providing for director liability only when director's "action or
failure to act involved an act or omission undertaken with deliberate intent to cause injury to the
corporation or undertaken with reckless disregard for the best interests of the corporation.').
22. For a thorough discussion of the mismanagement of financial institutions during the latter part
of the 1980s, see David B. Fischer, Comment, Bank Director Liability Under FIRREA: A New Defense
for Directors and Officers ofInsolvent Depository Institutions-Or a Tighter Noose?, 39 UCLA L. REV.
1703, 1706-07 (1992). Fischer explains:
Of the many causes contributing to the depository institution crisis, substantial attention
focused on the misdeeds perpetrated by some bank and thrift directors .... One savings and
loan scandal, focusing on a thrift director's efforts to "buy friends in Washington," implicated
five United States Senators.. . .The director of one failed institution was accused of spending
$850,000 of his thrift's funds to acquire "the world's foremost collection of magic-related
books, artifacts and artwork," according to regulators. Another was charged with squandering
his thrift's assets on prostitutes, beach houses, and a yacht. The excesses covered the
proverbial sublime-to-ridiculous range.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
23. See 12 U.S.C. § 1811(a) (1988) (creating the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
and providing that the FDIC "shall insure... the deposits of all banks and savings associations which
are entitled to the benefits of insurance under this chapter"); see also John M. Berry and Kathleen Day,
High Stakes as Banks Shed Reins; Taxpayers'Liability, Customers'Service at Risk, WASHINOTON POST
July 26, 1987, at HI (questioning the wisdom behind deregulating an industry whose major source of
money is insured by the federal government).
24. For a discussion of the deregulation of the banking industry and the commensurate expansion
of savings institutions' powers in the 1980s, see I MICHAEL P. MALLOY, THE CORPORATE LAW OF
BANKS: REGULATION OF CORPORATE AND SECURITIES AcrTIvrrEs OF DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS § 1.2
(1988) (noting that since 1980, the'powers of savings and loans has been expanded dramatically). See
also Douglas Frantz and Tom Furlong, Contagion of Ailing S&L's Poses Threat to Entire Thrift
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol73/iss3/35
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This degree of protection facilitated flagrant mismanagement of the
industry." When federal banking agencies26 sought to curb this misman-
agement, the same state statutes that stimulated the director's mismanage-
ment in the first instance rendered the agencies' attempts to redress the
situation futile.27 Congress responded by enacting the FIRREA, which
allows federal intervention into the field of corporate governance, an area
traditionally governed by state law.28 Unfortunately, the scope and effect
of this intervention remains uncertain.
II. FIRREA: MAKING DIRECTOR LIABILITY MORE STRINGENT
In response to state laws that insulated directors from liability, Congress
enacted FIRREA in 1989.' 9 In passing FIRREA, Congress sought to
strengthen the power of federal regulators0 and to curtail activities that
placed federal insurance funds at risk.31 To accomplish these objectives,
Congress needed to overcome the barriers to director liability imposed by
the recently enacted state legislation.32 Therefore, Congress enacted
Industry, L.A. TiMES, Jan. 3, 1988, at I ("The savings and loan business has been in trouble ever-since
[the 1980s] began... at first suffering huge losses sparked by soaring interest rates and later from poor
quality lending that was aided by bank deregulation. ..
25. See supra note 22.
26. The main federal regulatory bodies charged with policing the actions of financial institutions
are the FDIC and the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC). Congress has empowered the FDIC to
operate as a receiver and as a conservator, succeeding to any claims the shareholders may have had
against the institution's directors, 18 U.S.C. § 1821(c),(d)(1) (Supp. V 1993). Pursuant to FIRREA,
Congress created the RTC as an instrument of the United States, with powers similar to the FDIC
regarding receivership and conservatorship. 12 U.S.C. § 144la(b)(l) (Supp. V 1993).
27. In explaining an amendment to an early draft of FIRREA, Senator Reigle, Chairperson of the
Senate Banking Committee, expressed concern that "many states have enacted legislation that protects
directors and officers of companies from damage suits." 135 CoNO. REc. S4278 (daily ed. April 19,
1989).
28. See Cindy A. Schipani, Should Bank Directors Fear FIRREA: The FDIC's Enforcement of the
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act, 17 J. CoRP. L. 739, 741 (1992).
29. FIRREA, Pub. L. No. 101-73,103 Stat. 183 (1989) (codified in various sections of the U.S.C.).
30. FIRREA, Pub. L. No. 101-73, §101(9), 103 Stat. 183, 187 (1989) (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1811 (note) (Supp. V 1993)).
31. FIRREAPub. L.No. 101-73,101(3), 103 Stat. 183, 187 (1989) (codifiedat 12U.S.C. § 1811
(note) (Purposes of 1989 Amendment) (Supp. V 1993)).
32. FIRREA's legislative history makes it clear that the means by which the statute empowers
federal regulators and protects federally insured deposit funds involves preempting the state legislation
that made it difficult or impossible to hold directors personally liable. See H.R. Rep. No. 222, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess., 393, 398 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 432,437 ("[FIRREA] preempts State
law with respect to claims brought by the FDIC in any capacity against officers or directors of an
insured depository institution.'); 135 CONG. REC, S6912 (daily ed. June 19, 1989) ("[Section 1821(k)
of FIRREA] enables the FDIC to pursue claims against directors or officers of insured financial
Washington University Open Scholarship
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section 1821(k).33
A. Section 1821(k)
Section 1821(k) contains two relevant parts that determine the propriety
of state law claims under FIRREA.34 The first sentence of section 1821(k)
states that, in actions brought by federal regulatory agencies, directors of
federally insured financial institutions "may" be liable "for gross negli-
gence, including any similar conduct that demonstrates a greater disregard
of a duty of care ... ."I' Thus, by authorizing federal regulators to sue
for gross negligence, Congress preempted state laws that predicated director
liability upon reckless or other more culpable misconduct, as well as those
statutes that permitted shareholders to eliminate a director's liability.36
However, Congress expressly left the task of defining gross negligence to
the states.37
institutions for gross negligence (or negligent conduct that demonstrates a greater disregard of a duty
of care than gross negligence) or for intentional tortious conduct. This right supersedes state law
limitations that... would bar or impede such claims.").
33. See 135 CONG. REc. S4278 (daily ed. April 19, 1989). Senator Reigle's discussion of the
provision that would ultimately evolve into § 1821(k) explained that state insulating statutes protected
directors from liability and that:
[§ 1821(k)] totally preempt[s] State law in this area with respect to suits brought by the FDIC
against bank directors or officers. However, in light of the State law implications raised by
this provision,. . . State law would be overruled only to the extent that it forbids the FDIC
to bring suit based on "gross negligencee" or an "intentional tort." In determining whether or
not conduct constitutes "gross negligence"1 or an "intentional tort," applicable State law is to
govern. This amendment would thus allow the FDIC to sue a director or ofTicer guilty of
gross negligence or willdl misconduct, even if State law did not allow it.
Id. (emphasis added).
34. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) provides in pertinent part:
A director or officer of an insured depository institution may be held personally liable for
monetary damages in any civil action by, on behalf of, or at the request or direction of the
[FDIC or RTC] ... for gross negligence, including any similar conduct or conduct that
demonstrates a greater disregard of a duty of care (than gross negligence) including intentional
tortious conduct as such terms are defined and determined under applicable State law. Nothing
in this paragraph shall impair or affect any right of the [FDIC or RTC] under other applicable
law.
§ 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) (Supp. V 1993).
35. Id.
36. See supra notes 31-32. Under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution state
laws that conflict with a provision of federal law will be preempted. See generally Wisconsin Public
Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 604-06 (1991) (ruling a local government's attempt to regulate
pesticide use was preempted by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act). Thus, any state
law requiring conduct more culpable than gross negligence to impose liability would be preempted
under FIRREA's authorization of suits for gross negligence. See 12 U.S.C. § 182 1(k) (Supp. V 1993).
37. Id. Definitions of gross negligence vary from state to state. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 34, at 212 (5th ed. 1984) ("There is ... no generally
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol73/iss3/35
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The second sentence of section 1821(k) impacts the validity of state law
simple negligence claims under FIRREA, by preserving federal regulators'
rights to sue directors under "other applicable law."38 This phrase clearly
demonstrates Congress' intent not to impair federal regulators' access to
other, more stringent means of exposing directors to liability.a9
Surprisingly, despite the fact that over half of all savings and loans have
federal charters,4° neither FIRREA's text nor its history refer to those
charters.4 The statute's failure to differentiate between state and federally
chartered institutions permits the conclusion that section 1821(k) and its
preservation of state law claims applies to both types of institutions.
Moreover, in light of Congress' goal of empowering federal regulators,42
congressional silence on the matter strongly suggests that it did not intend
to use FIRREA's gross negligence standard to insulate directors from
liability when they would otherwise be subject to state law simple
negligence standards.43 Nonetheless, there is some doubt as to whether
directors of federally chartered institutions remain subject to state law
simple negligence claims.
B. Cases Interpreting Section 1821(k)
Two types of cases shed light on the propriety of state law simple
negligence claims against the directors of federally chartered institutions.
First, both the Ninth and Tenth Circuits have recently discussed the validity
accepted meaning [of gross negligence].").
38. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) (Supp. V 1993).
39. See supra note 33; see also 135 CONG. REC. S 6912 (daily ed. June 19, 1989)("[Section
1821(k)] does not prevent the FDIC from pursuing claims under State law or under other applicable
Federal law, if such law permits the officers or directors of a financial institution to be sued.., for
violating a lower standard of care, such as simple negligence.") For a thorough discussion of FIRREA's
legislative history and support of FIRREA's preservation of state law claims against state chartered
institutions, see Shepard, supra note 3. For a discussion of the possible use of FIRREA as a defense
to state law claims, see Fischer, supra note 22.
40. See National Comm'n on Financial Institution Reform, Recovery and Enforcement: Origins
and Causes of the S&L Debacle: A Blueprint for Reform: A Report to the President and Congress
(G.P.O. 1993).
41. See FIRREA, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (codified in scattered sections of the
U.S.C.); see also Resolution Trust Corp. v. Chapman, 29 F.3d 1120, 1126 (7th Cir. 1994) (Posner, J.,
dissenting) ("The liability of directors of S&L's which happened to have federal rather than state
charters was not discussed [by Congress], even though more than half of all S&L's were federally
chartered.").
42. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
43. For a discussion of FIRREA's legislative history indicating that directors may be subject to
suits under state law standards of liability after FIRREA, see supra note 39 and accompanying text.
1995] 1483
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of state law claims against state chartered institutions. These cases illustrate
how section 1821(k) operates to effectuate Congress' purpose of subjecting
directors to liability for their negligent actions.44 Second, in Resolution
Trust Corp. v. Gallagher,5 the Seventh Circuit recently discussed
FIRREA's effect on federal common law claims against federal institutions.
Gallagher provides a framework for analyzing FIRREA in the federal
charter context.
46
1. State Law and the State-Chartered Institution
In Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Canfield,47 the Tenth Circuit
held that FIRREA does not hinder the ability of federal regulators to rely
on state law simple negligence claims against state chartered institutions.4"
In Canfield, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) brought a
state law claim against the directors of a Utah Savings and Loan for
negligent mismanagement of the institution.49 Arguing that section 1821(k)
preempts state law simple negligence liability by imposing a federal gross
negligence standard, the directors of the institution sought to dismiss the
FDIC's simple negligence claim50
However, the Tenth Circuit explained that the language, purpose, and
history of FIRREA did not support the directors' position."1 In rejecting
the directors' argument, the Canfield court focused first on the plain
44. See infra notes 47-65.
45. 10 F.3d 416 (7th Cir. 1993).
46. See infra notes 66-77.
47. 967 F.2d 443 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 113 S. Ct. 516 (1992).
48. Id. at 449. A number of district courts have held similarly. See, e.g., RTC v. Rahn, 854 F.
Supp. 480 (W.D. Mich. 1994); RTC v. Heiserman, 839 F. Supp. 1457 (D. Colo. 1993); RTC v.
DiDomenico, 837 F. Supp. 623 (D.N.J. 1993); RTC v. Gershman, 829 F. Supp. 1095 (E.D. Mo. 1993);
FDIC v. Miller, 781 F. Supp. 1271 (N.D. Ill. 1991); FDIC v. Williams, 779 F. Supp. 63 (N.D. Tex.
1991), claim dismissed, 781 F. Supp. 1271. But see FDIC v. Swager, 773 F. Supp. 1244 (D. Minn.
1991); FDIC v. Brown, 737 F. Supp. 626 (D. Utah 1989).
49. Canfield, 967 F.2d at 444.
50. Id. at 445.
51. Id. at 446-449. In stating its holding, the court noted that "the plain language of the statute
demands" a denial of the defendants' motion to dismiss. Id. at 449. In addition to basing its decision
on the text of § 1821(k), the court also indicated that FIRREA's "legislative history is consistent with
our interpretation of the statute's plain language." Id. at 448 n.6 (citing 135 CoNO. REC. S4278-79
(daily ed. April 19, 1989); 135 CoNG. REc. 86912 (daily ed. June 19, 1989)). Also, the court noted that
to hold that federal regulators could not bring state law claims would frustrate Congress's stated purpose
of protecting the federally insured deposit funds. Id. at 449 (citing FIRREA, Pub. L. No. 101-73,
§ 101(3), 103 Stat, 183, 187 (1989) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (note) (Purpose of 1989 Amendment)
(Supp. V 1993)).
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language of section 1821(k). 2 The court held that because section 1821(k)
states that federal regulators "may" bring actions for gross negligence, as
opposed to "may only" bring an action for gross negligence, FIRREA did
not foreclose a state law simple negligence action.53
The court found support for its conclusion in section 1812(k)'s section
dealing with preservation of "other applicable law."54 Believing state law
simple negligence claims to constitute "other applicable law," the court
reasoned that Congress authorized simple negligence claims when the state
in which the institution operated permitted such claims." The court also
noted that Congress' decision to let the state law define gross negligence
belied the directors' argument that Congress intended FIRREA to set a
uniform gross negligence standard.56
Finally, the court noted an absurdity in the directors' position. The
court explained that the failure of a financial institution triggers the federal
regulators' ability to sue the institution's directors on behalf of the
52. Canfield, 967 F.2d at 449 ("We hold that the plain language of the statute demands"
application of the state law standard of care.). In particular, the court focused on the language in
§ 1821(k) providing that "a director or officer may be held personally liable for monetary damages...
for gross negligence." Id. at 446 (alteration in original) (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) (Supp. V 1993)).
53. Id. The court stated that:
"May" is a permissive term, and it does not imply a limitation on the standards of officer and
director liability .... [N]o reasonable construction of "may" results in an absolute limitation
of the liability of officers or directors to instances of gross negligence. Rather, the first
sentence of section 1821(k) effectively provides that even where state law under which the
FDIC is authorized to bring suit otherwise limits actions against officers and directors to
intentional misconduct, an officer or director may nevertheless be held liable for gross
negligence. In states where an officer or director is liable for simple negligence, however, the
FDIC may rely, as it does in this case, on state law to enable its action.
Id (citations omitted). For additional case law supporting the position that "may" does not equate to
"may only," see Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 626-27 (implying that "may" should not be read as "may
only"), and Resolution Trust Corp. v. Lightfoot, 938 F.2d 65, 66-67 (7th Cir. 1991) (same).
54. Canfield, 967 F.2d at 446-47. For a statement of the pertinent provision of § 1821(k), see
supra note 34.
55. Canfield, 967 F.2d at 446-47. The court explained its reasoning with regard to § 1821(k)'s last
sentence as follows:
[W]e believe that "other applicable law" means all "other applicable law." Under the statute
then, any other law providing that an officer or director may be held liable for simple
negligence survives; such a law would be an "other applicable law," and construing the statute
to bar its application would "impair the FDIC's rights under it."
Id (footnote omitted).
56. Id. at 447. The court reasoned that "[s]tate law definitions of gross negligence differ. Indeed,
'there is ... no generally accepted meaning [of gross negligence].' These differences mean that the
statute cannot possibly, even without the last sentence, create a national standard of liability." Id.
(citations omitted).
57. Id. at 449.
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shareholders, whereas a shareholder of the institution can sue under state
law at any time prior to failure.5" Thus, the court noted that preventing
federal regulators from employing state law provisions could, in effect,
induce directors of a struggling institution to allow the institution to fail in
order to obtain the shield of FIRREA's gross negligence standard.59
Reasoning that such a result would impair Congress' purpose of protecting
federally insured deposit funds, the court held that FIRREA did not
preempt state law provisions for simple negligence applied to state
chartered institutions.'
Three months after Canfield, the Ninth Circuit reached the same
conclusion in Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. McSweeney.61
McSweeney involved the FDIC's attempt to hold the directors of a
California savings and loan liable under that state's simple negligence
standard of liability.62 The directors moved to dismiss the state law claim,
also arguing that FIRREA set a uniform gross negligence standard of
liability and therefore preempted actions based on state law.63 Relying on
reasoning similar to the Canfield court's,' the Ninth Circuit rejected the
directors' motion to dismiss and held that FIRREA permits federal
58. Id.
59. Canfield, 967 F.2d at 449.
60. Id. ("It simply cannot be that FIRREA would indirectly encourage such behavior...
61. 976 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2440 (1993).
62. Id. at 533. When appointed to the board of Central Savings and Loan, McSweeney instituted
some questionable loan and investment programs which resulted in substantial losses. Id. The Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Company (FSLIC) placed Central into receivership. Id. Because of the
receivership, the FDIC succeeded to Central's claims against McSweeney and subsequently brought suit
under California Corporate Code § 309 for negligent mismanagement of the institution. Id. at 533-34.
63. Id. at 534. The directors also argued that the FDIC's claim was barred by the statute of
limitations. Id. The court disagreed. Id. at 536.
64. Id. at 536-41. In many ways, the McSweeney court's opinion parallels that of the Tenth Circuit
in Canfield. The McSweeney court began its analysis by focusing on the permissive nature of §
1821(k)'s first sentence. Id. at 537-38 ("Had Congress intended this authorizing provision to limit the
FDIC to claims alleging gross negligence or greater culpability, it would have inserted the word "only"
in the sentence.'). The court also relied upon the second sentence of§ 1821(k) to reject the defendants'
argument that FIRREA created a single, uniform standard. Id. at 538-39. ("Like the Canfield court, we
find no limitation [in the second sentence of § 1821(k)] that would preclude the FDIC from seeking
remedies available under state law."). Moreover, the McSweeney court noted that its reading of the
statute's plain language squared with the statute's legislative history. Id. at 540. Finally, similar to the
Canfield court, the McSweeney court thought that the directors' argument that FIRREA created a
uniform standard of gross negligence would create "the perverse incentive for a director in an institution
that is having financial difficulty to permit the thrift to fall into ruin ... since the director's own
exposure would be greatly reduced upon the institution of a receivership." Id. (quoting Federal Deposit
Insurance Corp. v. McSweeney, 772 F. Supp. 1154, 1159 (S.D. Cal. 1991), afid, 976 F.2d 532 (9th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2440 (1993)).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol73/iss3/35
1995] DIRECTOR LIABILITY 1487
regulators to sue directors of failed financial institutions under a more
stringent standard of liability than gross negligence if state law allows such
a claim.65
2. Federal Common Law Actions after FIRREA
Another type of case interpreting section 1821(k) involves federally
chartered institutions. These cases address whether FIRREA's gross
negligence standard preempts federal common law's simple negligence
standard.' In 1993, the Seventh Circuit became the first circuit to analyze
the propriety of a federal common law simple negligence action after
FIRREA.67
In Resolution Trust Corp. v. Gallagher,68 the Resolution Trust Corpora-
tion (RTC) sued the directors of a federally chartered institution.69 The
RTC sought to recover losses resulting from the directors' negligence.7"
The RTC premised its claim on the theory that FIRREA did not preempt
federal common law actions based on simple negligence.71
65. McSweeney, 976 F.2d at 541.
66. In all cases discussing this issue, courts have accepted for the sake of argument that federal
common law provides for simple negligence liability. The majority of these courts have ruled that
FIRREA's gross negligence standard preempts federal common law. See, e.g., RTC v. Miramon, 22
F.3d 1357, 1364 (5th Cir. 1994); FDIC v. Harrington, 844 F. Supp. 300, 304-05 (N.D. Tex. 1994);
FDIC v. Bates, 838 F. Supp. 1216, 1220 (N.D. Ohio 1993), rev'd, 42 F.3d 369 (6th Cir. 1994); FDIC
v. Gonzalez-Gorrondona, 833 F. Supp. 1545, 1552 (S.D. Fla. 1993); RTC v. Farmer, 823 F. Supp. 302,
307 (E.D. Pa. 1993); RTC v. Hecht, 818 F. Supp. 894, 901-02 (D. Md. 1992); FDIC v. Brown, 812 F.
Supp. 722, 726 (S.D. Tex. 1992); FDIC v. Barham, 794 F. Supp. 187, 191 (W.D. La. 1991), aff'd, 995
F.2d 600 (5th Cir. 1993); FDIC v. Miller, 781 F. Supp. 1271, 1275 (N.D. II. 1991). See contra RTC
v. Gibson, 829 F. Supp. 1110, 1118 (W.D. Mo. 1993); RTC v. Hess, 820 F. Supp. 1359, 1364 (D. Utah
1993) (concluding that "§ 1821(k) does not... preempt applicable ... federal common law."); FDIC
v. Nihiser, 799 F. Supp. 904, 907 (C.D. Ill. 1992).
67. RTC v. Gallagher, 10 F.3d 416, 417 (7th Cir. 1993) ("No other circuit courts have directly
addressed this issue.").
68. 10 F.3d 416 (7th Cir. 1993).
69. Id. at 418. In 1990, the Concordia Federal Bank for Savings failed and the RTC placed the
institution into receivership. Id. The RTC instituted the federal common law simple negligence actions
on behalf of the shareholders of the institution against Concordia's directors. The directors allegedly
had mismanaged the bank, causing it to incur losses and fail. Id.
70. Id. In addition to negligence, the RTC also alleged breach of fiduciary duty, gross negligence
and breach of contract Id.
7 1. Id. The RTC's argument that FIRREA did not preempt federal common law relied primarily
on the framework developed by the Canfield and McSweeney courts for state law claims. Id. at 420-22.
The RTC argued that the permissive language of § 1821(k)'s first sentence, the savings clause in the
second sentence, and Congress' purpose of strengthening the power of federal regulators equally
supported the preservation of federal common law simple negligence claims and state law simple
negligence claims. Id.
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The Seventh Circuit sustained the directors' motion to dismiss the RTC's
federal common law simple negligence claim, holding that FIRREA
preempted federal common law.72 The court stated that, in order to
preempt federal common law, Congress need only speak directly to the
issue at hand.73 The court found that FIRREA's authorization of gross
negligence actions spoke directly to the standard of care issue and therefore
preempted any preexisting federal common law standard.7 4 The court
refused to read FIRREA's savings clause as preserving federal common law
simple negligence actions because such a reading would make 1821(k)'s
authorization of gross negligence actions mere surplusage.75
However, the Gallagher court declined to decide whether FIRREA
preempted state law simple negligence claims against directors of a
federally chartered institution.76 According to the court, when federal
preemption of state law is at issue, concerns of federalism require greater
evidence of Congress' preemptory intent than a consideration of the
propriety of federal common law after congressional action.77 The court's
72. Gallagher, 10 F.3d at 424-25.
73. Id. at 419. The court noted at the outset that federal common law plays a very limited role in
areas where Congress has legislated. Id. The court recognized that Congress, not the federal courts,
determines the appropriate standards for federal law. Id. Thus, the court reasoned, if Congress" 'spoke
directly' to the issue of what standard of liability governs suits brought by the RTC against officers and
directors of failed federally chartered financial institutions," then the federal common law standards
would be preempted. Id.
74. Id. at 424-25. In answering whether Congress spoke directly to the issue at hand, the court
noted the following:
It is hard to imagine a more definitive statement by Congress that a gross negligence standard
of liability applies to cases brought by the RTC against officers and directors of failed
financial institutions. Consequently, federal common law.., must yield to Congress' clear
statement that a gross negligence standard of liability applies.
Id. at 420. To support its conclusion, the court referred to prior United States Supreme Court precedent
that found federal common law standards for interstate water pollution to be preempted by Congress'
creation of "a comprehensive regulatory program supervised by an expert administrative agency." Id.
at 423-24 (quoting Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981)). The Gallagher court noted that
similar to the legislation at issue in Milwaukee, FIRREA created a complex regulatory regime that left
no room for federal common law. Id. at 424.
75. Id. at 420 ("It is illogical that Congress intended in one sentence to establish a gross
negligence standard of liability and in the next sentence to eviscerate that standard by allowing actions
under federal common law for simple negligence.").
76. Id. at 424 ("[W]e stress that we do not reach the issue of whether § 1821(k)'s gross negligence
standard pre-empts state law.").
77. Id. In explaining the differing standards governing preemption of state law as opposed to
federal common law, the court stated that:
mhe appropriate analysis in determining if federal statutory law governs a question
previously the subject of federal common law is not the same as that employed in deciding
if federal law pre-empts state law. In considering the latter question "we start with the
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refusal to rule on the preemption of state law in the federal charter context
left the issue open for future consideration. Moreover, by noting the greater
standard of proof required when state law claims are involved, the court
invited federal regulators to bring state law simple negligence claims
against directors of federal institutions. In 1994, the RTC accepted the
invitation.
III. RESOLUTION TRUST CORP. V. CHAPMAN: A UNIFORM STANDARD OF
LIABILITY FOR DIRECTORS OF FEDERALLY CHARTERED FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS
In Resolution Trust Corp. v. Chapman, the Seventh Circuit became the
first circuit to analyze FIRREA in a case involving state law claims against
directors of a federally chartered institution.78 The decision departed from
the cases that recognize Congress' preservation of state law claims for
simple negligence.79 In turn, the court signaled the development of a
uniform gross negligence standard of liability for directors of insolvent,
federally chartered financial institutions."°
In Chapman, the RTC sued the former directors of a failed, federally
assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the
Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." While we have not
hesitated to find pre-emption of state law, whether express or implied, when Congress has so
indicated, or when enforcement of state regulations would impair "federal superintendence of
the field," our analysis has included "due regard for the presuppositions of our embracing
federal system, including the principle of diffusion of power not as a matter of doctrinaire
localism but as a promoter of democracy." Such concerns are not implicated in the same
fashion when the question is whether federal statutory or federal common law governs, and
accordingly, the same sort of evidence of clear and manifest purpose is not required.
Id (quoting Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 316-17).
78. 29 F.3d 1120 (7th Cir. 1994). Prior to the Chapman decision, three district court cases briefly
touched upon the propriety of state law claims against directors of federal institutions. See RTC v.
Ascher, No. CIV.A.92-B-424, 1994 WL 52687, at * 3 (D. Colo. Feb. 14, 1994) (concluding that
FIRREA's savings clause "allows the RTC to bring state based claims for ordinary negligence against
the director defendants of a federally insured, federally-chartered institution."); RTC v. Farmer, 823 F.
Supp. 302, 307 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (concluding that state law claims cannot be brought against directors
of federally chartered institutions); RTC v. Hess, 820 F. Supp. 1359, 1362 (D. Utah 1993) ("[F]ederal
law exclusively governs the internal affairs of federal savings and loan associations, including director
liability.").
79. For a discussion of the two main cases preserving state law claims, see supra notes 47-65 and
accompanying text. While these cases involved state chartered institutions, one district court, without
mentioning McSweeny, noted that Canfield "did not rest upon whether the institution held a state or
federal charter." Ascher, 1994 WL 52687 at *3.
80. Chapman, 29 F.3d at 1123 (stating that FIRREA "adopts gross negligence as the rule for
managers and directors of federal financial institutions").
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chartered financial institution that operated in Illinois." The RTC, on
behalf of the institution's shareholders, sought to recover damages allegedly
resulting from injuries to the federal deposit insurance fund and to the
institution's financial standing. 2 Consistent with Illinois law,8" the RTC
based its claim on a simple negligence theory. 4
The majority held that a gross negligence standard governs suits by the
RTC against directors of failed federally chartered financial institutions.8"
The majority opinion endorsed the Canfield and McSweeney decisions,86
acknowledging that the savings clause in FIRREA permits state law claims
,based on conduct less culpable than the gross negligence standard
prescribed by FIRREA."7 Having determined that FIRREA does not
preempt state law simple negligence claims against directors of state
charted institutions, the court then examined whether federal regulators may
take advantage of state law in actions against federally chartered financial
institutions.88 The court concluded that a choice of law principle known
as the "internal affairs doctrine" prevents the application of state simple
negligence standards to federally chartered institutions.8 9 By creating a
rebuttable presumption in favor of the incorporating jurisdiction's standard
of liability, the internal affairs doctrine resolves the potentially conflicting
81. Chapman, 29 F.3d at 1121-22.
82. Id. at 1121.
83. Id. at 1122. The court assumed that Illinois common law permitted recovery against negligent
directors of financial institutions. Id. (citing Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Munday, 131 N.E. 103 (I11.
1921)).
84. Chapman, 29 F.3d at 1122.
85. Id. at 1123.
86. See supra notes 41-60 and accompanying text.
87. Id. Chapman, 29 F.3d at 1122. The directors responded to the RTC's simple negligence claim
by arguing that FIRREA preempted all state law claims. After studying the language of § 1821(k), the
court found the directors' position untenable. It. The court noted that:
The final sentence of§ 1821(k)... ensures that actions based on state law are not preempted.
Even if we doubted the correctness of [McSweeney and Canfield] which we do not, we would
not think it prudent to create a conflict among the circuits. Clauses similar to the final
sentence of§ 1821(k) regularly are understood to save state law against claims of preemption.
Thus, the RTC may take advantage of any claims available to it under state law.
Id. at 1122 (citations omitted).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1123. Regarding the appropriate standard of liability to apply, the court determined that
"[tihe advent of inter-state banking ... leads us to apply the internal affairs doctrine to this case.
Security held a federal charter, so national law governs the liability of officers and directors for their
management." Id. For additional discussion of the rationale behind the internal affairs doctrine, see CTS
Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 88-93 (1987); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645
(1982).
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obligations that follows a corporation's multistate operations.9" Courts
applying the internal affairs doctrine have permitted parties to rebut this
presumption if the "justified expectations" of those connected with the
corporation warrant application of the forum state's laws.9' Similarly, if
the law of the jurisdiction of incorporation is difficult to determine,
considerations of "certainty"'92 and "ease in determination"93 may warrant
application of the forum state's laws.94 While the Chapman court
acknowledged that the internal affairs doctrine is merely a rebuttable
presumption,95 it applied the doctrine as a bright line rule, failing to
consider the factors that traditionally have been applied to rebut the
presumption in favor of the incorporating jurisdiction's standard.96
The Chapman court's application of the internal affairs doctrine led it to
conclude that, regardless of FIRREA's preservation of state law claims,
federal law governs directors of insolvent federal institutions.9 7 In
searching for the appropriate standard under federal law, the court followed
the Gallagher court's holding8 that section 1821(k)'s gross negligence
standard, rather than any more stringent federal common law, controlled.99
90. The Chapman court explained the internal affairs doctrine and its application to issues of
liability standards as follows:
When the subject is liability of officers and directors for their stewardship of the corporation,
the law presumptively applicable is the law of the place of incorporation. This venerable
choice-of-law principle, known as the internal affairs doctrine, is recognized throughout the
states, and by the Supreme Court as well.
29 F.3d at 1122 (citations omitted); see generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICr OF LAWS
§ 309 (1971).
91. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 6, 309 (1971) (providing that the
internal affairs doctrine's presumption in favor of the incorporating jurisdiction's laws may be rebutted
by reference to the "justified expectations" of those connected with the corporation).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Several courts have applied such factors to rebut the presumption in favor of the incorporating
junsdiction's laws. See, e.g., Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 263-64 (2d Cir. 1984);
Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Johnson, 268 F.2d 317, 320-21 (5th Cir. 1959); Ficor, Inc. v.
McHugh, 639 P.2d 385, 391 (Colo. 1982) (en bane).
95. Chapman, 29 F.3d at 1122.
96. See id. at 1123. After discussing why the internal affairs doctrine should apply to a federally
chartered institution doing business in a state, the court simply noted that "[s]ecurity held a federal
charter, so national law governs the liability of officers and directors for their management." Id.
97. Id.
98. Two of the three judges deciding Chapman wrote separate opinions expressing their
dissatisfaction with the Gallagher decision, but also noting its precedental weight. Id. at 1125 (Rouner,
J., concurring), 1125-28 (Posner, CJ., dissenting).
99. Id. at 1123. In concluding its search for the relevant federal law to apply, the court noted "[wie
concluded in Gallagher that [§ 1821(k)] adopts gross negligence as the rule for managers and directors
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Accordingly, because the internal affairs doctrine required application of the
gross negligence standard enunciated in FIRREA, the court dismissed the
RTC's state law simple negligence claim."e
Judge Posner dissented from the majority's opinion."0' He argued that
Congress' failure to mention the charter of an institution in FIRREA did
not warrant the court's creation of a new immunity for directors of federal
institutions who would have otherwise been subjected to the negligence
standard of a particular state."0 2 Judge Posner recognized that Congress
designed FIRREA to make directors of failed financial institutions more
susceptible to liability and concluded that the majority opinion diluted the
power of federal regulators in contravention to this purpose."t 3
Judge Posner also concluded that the court misapplied the internal affairs
doctrine." To support his claim, Posner focused on "justified expecta-
of federal financial institutions. We need not devise federal common law; Congress has laid down the
law." Id.
100. Chapman, 29 F.3d at 1124-25.
101. Id. at 1125-28. In addition to Judge Posner's dissent, Judge Rovner wrote a concurring
opinion. Id. at 1125. In her opinion, Judge Rovner expressed sympathy for Judge Posner's analysis but
agreed with Judge Easterbrook that the internal affairs doctrine "compels application of federal law to
the internal affairs of a federally-chartered institution." Id.
102. Id. at 1126. Judge Posner examined the text of FIRREA and noted that Congress did not even
mention the effect a federal charter may have on director liability. Id. Rather than imply from the
congressional silence that federal regulators could only sue directors of federal institutions for gross
negligence, Judge Posner focused on Congress' intent in passing FIRREA and sought to explain
FIRREA's silence. Id. Judge Posner suggested that:
[t]he likeliest reason for the apparent oversight is that there was no history of having to decide
which jurisdiction's law would govern a particular dispute over directors' liability. Directors'
liability had been primarily a common law field; the pertinent common law doctrines (the
business-judgement rule, the duty of loyalty, etc.) had been similar across states and similar
also to the federal common law of directors' liability., . ; and banks and related financial
institutions were invariably local rather than multistate, so potential interstate conflicts in the
obligations of bank directors could not arise. Congress is not gifted with omniscience and
does not have the leisure to be able to tie a pretty ribbon around every piece of legislation,
and so it often either overlooks or chooses not to attempt to solve problems that lack present
salience or urgency. The use by judges of the form of words that Congress has employed to
deal with . . . the problem of states' curtailing the liabilities of directors ... to solve a
problem of which there is no evidence that Congress was even aware is a formula for the
perversion of legislative purpose. We play "Gotcha!" with Congress. We make traps of its
words.
Id.
103. Id. at 1127. In discussing the effect of the majority's opinion, Judge Posner noted that "[w]hat
would otherwise be a more stringent standard, that of simple negligence, is diluted by interpretation of
a statute intended to make the liability of such directors more stringent. The statute has been turned on
its head." Id.
104. Chapman, 29 F.3d at 1126 ("Even if we indulge the fiction that Congress was secretly aware
of the internal-affairs doctrine of corporation law and secretly intended it to apply to suits by the RTC
against federally chartered S & Ls, it does not follow, as the court believes, that the doctrine would bar
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tions," noting that all evidence indicated that those connected with the
institution thought Illinois law would apply to a dispute of this charac-
ter.'°5 Moreover, with regard to the "certainty" considerations that may
also rebut the presumption in favor of the incorporating jurisdiction's
standards, Posner highlighted the confusion surrounding whether FIRREA's
gross negligence standard or a standard existing under federal common law
constituted the appropriate federal law standard."ca According to the
dissent, this confusion justified application of Illinois' more certain simple
negligence provisions." 7
Simply stated, the Chapman holding provides that, regardless of any state
law provisions for simple negligence culpability, directors of failed,
federally chartered institutions may only be sued for gross negligence'05
or conduct evincing a greater disregard of their duty of care. 9 By
rendering an act of Congress subordinate to the internal affairs doctrine
and, in effect, using FIRREA to insulate rather than expose directors of
financial institutions, the Chapman decision marks a disturbing departure
from congressional intent.
the application of Illinois law in this case."). For a case decided after the Chapman decision that
supports Posner's application of the internal affairs doctrine see RTC v. Everhart, 37 F.3d 151 (4th Cir.
1994).
105. 29 F.3d at 1126-27. Judge Posner began his internal affairs analysis by stressing that the
doctrine only creates a rebuttable presumption in favor of application of the law of the incorporating
jurisdiction. Id. He noted that this presumption may be overcome by demonstrating that the "justified
expectations" of those connected with the business warrant application of another jurisdiction's laws.
Id at 1127. Considering the expectations of those involved in the instant case, Judge Posner noted that:
[e]veryone connected with Security would have thought Illinois law applicable to a dispute
of this character. Security had been an Illinois corporation for a century, and nothing in the
text or provision of the statute under which it converted to a federal S & L would have
suggested that the liability of its directors or officers was being altered by the change.
Id
106. Id. ("This case well illustrates the difficulty of determining the rule of decision if federal law,
the law of the chartering jurisdiction, is applied instead of the law of the S & L's principal place of
business."). Id.
107. Id. Because of the possibility that federal common law standards rather than the standard
established in FIRREA constituted the appropriate federal standard, Judge Posner found the federal
standard to be fraught with uncertainty. However, he noted, "[there is no comparable uncertainty about
the contents of the Illinois law of director's liabilities." Id. Based on the relative certainty of the proper
standard under federal and state law, Posner concluded that state law provided the more certain, and
therefore the more proper, standard of liability. Id.
108. See supra text accompanying note 85.
109. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) (Supp. V 1993).
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VI. CHAPMAN'S IMACT
The Chapman court's decision to limit federal regulators' efforts to hold
directors of failed federally chartered financial institution liable for their
actions will affect several aspects of financial institution regulation.
A. Frustrating Intent: Insulating Directors
Congress enacted FIRREA to make it easier for injured parties to sue
directors of failed financial institutions."' Prior to Chapman, a state
could, consistent with FIRREA's purpose, raise the standard of care for
directors to afford its citizens the added protection of a simple negligence
standard."' The Chapman holding creates a uniform standard of liability
for directors of federally chartered institutions and removes a state's power
to impose higher standards of care on directors of such institutions."2
This decision frustrates Congress' purpose of empowering federal regulators
by making it harder to sue directors of institutions in simple negligence
states.' Moreover, it contradicts the language of section 1821(k) that
gives states the authority to enact "other applicable law" that federal
regulators may utilize." 4
In addition to transforming FIRREA into a statute that weakens the
powers of federal regulators, the Chapman holding also places federally
insured deposit funds at risk by creating an incentive for directors to let a
federally chartered institution slip into insolvency." 5 As noted by both
110. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
111. See Chapman, 29 F.3d at 1126 (Posner, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority opinion for
"creating a new immunity for directors of federal S & Ls by depriving the RTC of the benefit of state
laws that imposed higher duties on directors.").
112. See id. at 1125 (Posner, J., dissenting) (noting that after Chapman "the RTC must prove gross
negligence, even though Illinois law makes the directors of financial institutions to which its law applies
liable to shareholders for simple negligence.").
113. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
114. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) (Supp. V 1993) ("Nothing in this paragraph shall impair or affect any
right of the [federal regulatory agencies] under other applicable law."). For a discussion of the cases
that have interpreted this section to preserve state law simple negligence actions see supra notes 54-56,
66-67 and accompanying text. See also Chapman, 29 F.3d at 1122 (endorsing the opinions of courts
that have held FIRREA not to preempt causes of actions based on state law).
115. Without relying on the charter of the institution, a few state charter cases have recognized that
denying federal regulators access to state law simple negligence claims makes it harder to hold directors
responsible when the institution fails. See, e.g., FDIC v. McSweeney, 976 F.2d 532, 540-41 (9th cir.
1992); FDIC v. Canfield, 967 F.2d 443, 449 (10th Cir. 1992). Clearly this effect contravenes Congress'
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the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, t1 6 under FIRREA, a federal regulator's right
to sue the directors of an institution commences upon the institution's
declaration of insolvency and subsequent entry into receivership." 7
Because the shareholders of an institution doing business in a simple
negligence state may bring actions for simple negligence prior to insolven-
cy," 8 the Chapman court's decision to limit federal regulators to bringing
actions for gross negligence gives directors of federally chartered
institutions the incentive to allow their institutions to become insolvent."1 9
The creation of this perverse incentive frustrates FIRREA's goal of
curtailing activities that threaten the federally insured deposit fund 20
B. High Cost for Uniformity: Impairing a State's Regulatory Powers
Under FIRREA
The propriety of Chapman's holding after Canfield and McSweeney
depends in part on the effect that a federal charter has on the analysis under
FIRREA and the validity of state law claims. 2' By authorizing federal
charters, Congress sought to establish a regulatory regime that would
promote uniformity in banking." Congress vested the Office of Thrift
Supervision (OTS) with authority to regulate all aspects of federal financial
institutions."2 To date, the OTS has not promulgated any regulations
governing the standard of care owed by directors of federally chartered
116. See supra notes 47-65 and accompanying text.
117. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(dX2XA) (Supp. V 1993). Section 1821(d)(2)(A) provides that the federal
regulatory agencies "shall, as conservator or receiver, and by operation of law, succeed to... all rights,
titles, powers, and privileges of the insured depository institution, and of any stockholder, member,
accountholder, depositor, officer, or director of such institution .... Id.
118. See McSweeney, 976 F.2d at 540 ("Before the failure of a thrift and the involvement of federal
regulators, liability would attach for simple negligence.").
119. See Chapman, 29 F.3d at 1123-25. The court held that federal regulators could only sue
directors for gross negligence. Id. By denying federal regulators the right to sue for simple negligence,
the court precludes simple negligence claims only after the institution has gone into receivership. See
supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text. Thus, the Chapman decision affords directors greater
protection if the institution is insolvent than if solvent. See id. at 1127. (Posner, J., dissenting).
120. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
121. For a discussion of Canfield and McSweeney see supra notes 47-65 and accompanying text.
122. See Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 161 (1982). Congress has
authorized a federal charter system. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (Supp. V 1993). In discussing Congress'
authorization of federal charters, the de la Cuesta court noted that Congress "delegated to the [Office
of Thrift Supervision] broad authority to establish and regulate 'a uniform system of [savings and loan]
institutions ... '." de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 166.
123. See 12 C.F.R. § 545.2 (1995).
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financial institutions.' 24
In the absence of any applicable regulations, courts have held that
federally chartered institutions are subject to the laws of the state in which
they operate unless those laws conflict with a federal law or impair
congressional objectives."z Thus, whether the directors of an insolvent,
federally chartered institution are subject to state law simple negligence
claims depends first on whether the state law conflicts with section
1821(k).126 Most courts agree that the second sentence of section 1821(k)
constitutes a savings clause, preserving the "other applicable law"' 27 of
states holding directors to the higher standard of simple negligence. 2 8
Based on FIRREA's savings clause, a state's lesser standard of liability
would not conflict with FIRREA.
However, the application of a higher standard of care under state law
could arguably conflict with Congress' goal of promoting uniform banking
standards.'29 Although relying on state law standards of. liability could
certainly create divergent standards throughout the country, FIRREA's
language itself advocates different standards. 3 FIRREA utilizes a gross
negligence standard, but its savings clause preserves the very state law that
could create nonconformity.' Moreover, even without FIRREA's savings
clause, the statute would frustrate uniformity by expressly relying on widely
varying state law definitions of gross negligence.3 2
Congress' goal of uniformity in authorizing federal charters and the
language of section 1821(k) are not necessarily inconsistent. If one reads
section 182 1(k) as setting a uniform minimum standard of liability and only
permitting more stringent deviation by the states, then the statutory
124. See generally id. at §§ 541-84.
125. See, e.g., Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 248 (1943) ("[N]ational banks are
subject to state laws, unless those laws infringe the national banking laws.... ."); National State Bank
v. Long, 630 F.2d 981 (3d Cir. 1980).
126. Analysis under the Supremacy Clause ofthe United States Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. VI,
cl. 2, would require preemption of state law standards of liability if those standards conflicted with
federal banking law or frustrated the purpose behind federal charters. See EDWARD L. SYMONS, JR. AND
JAMES J. WHITE, BANKING LAW 67 (3d ed. 1991).
127. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) (Supp. V 1993).
128. See supra notes 48, 55-56, 65, 87 and accompanying text.
129. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 33-34.
131. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) (Supp. V 1993). Section 1821(k) provides that "n]othing in this
paragraph shall impair or affect any right of the [federal regulatory agencies] under other applicable
law." Id. For a discussion of cases interpreting this language to preserve state law actions for simple
negligence see supra notes 48, 55-56, 65, 87 and accompanying text.




language furthers Congress' purpose of promoting uniformity in the federal
charter context. 133 Thus, consistent with the federal charter provisions, a
uniform minimum standard may exist in harmony with FIRREA's purpose
of protecting the federally insured deposit funds and empowering federal
regulators.
134
Despite the potential for harmonizing the goal of uniformity with those
of section 1821(k), the Chapman court employed the internal affairs
doctrine to favor uniformity at the expense of both the statutory language
of FIRREA and Congress' purposes in enacting it. 31 In effect, the court's
decision signals an unwarranted judicial prioritization. The Chapman court
myopically forced a result consistent with uniformity but ignored the fact
that its decision causes FIRREA to weaken the power of federal regulators
and states.
Ultimately, the Chapman decision affects a state's power to regulate
operations within its jurisdiction by influencing the organizational decisions
of a financial institution. 136 As prior cases make clear, the directors of a
state chartered institution are subject to regulators' claims of state law
negligence. 137 However, Chapman makes equally clear that the directors
of federally chartered institutions are not subject to state simple negligence
standards. 138 To escape state law simple negligence claims, financial
institutions currently organized under state law will likely switch to federal
charters for the added protection offered by the Chapman court. 39 By
inducing institutions to choose federal rather than state charters, the
Chapman decision takes a major step towards stripping states of their
powers to regulate all forms of banking, powers that FIRREA's savings
133. Many courts have held that FIRREA's language and history indicate that Congress only
intended to establish a uniform minimum standard of liability. See supra notes 47-65 and accompanying
text.
134. Indeed, in light of Congress's decision in FIRREA to use state law to define gross negligence,
absolute uniformity, be it maximum or minimum, is not possible. See supra notes 37, 56 and
accompanying text. However, interpreting § 1821(k) to impose a uniform maximum gross negligence
standard of liability on directors of federal institutions has the effect of frustrating Congress' clearly
stated purpose of strengthening the power of federal regulators, see supra note 30 and accompanying
text, and protecting the federally insured deposit fund. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
136. For a thorough discussion of a financial institution's decision to organize with a state or federal
charter see I MALLOY, supra note 24, § 10.2.
137. See supra notes 47-65 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 78-109 and accompanying text.
139. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(o) permits financial institutions to convert from a state to a federal charter
under certain conditions. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(o) (Supp. V 1993).
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clause and our federal system preserve."'
C. The Internal Affairs Doctrine: Further Weakening the States
A state's role in regulating federal institutions is further diminished upon
examining the Chapman court's internal affairs analysis. The court failed
to apply the factors that traditionally rebut the presumption in favor of the
chdlrter jurisdiction's law. 41 While the majority uses this doctrine to
remove failed federal institutions from the reach of state law, Judge
Posner's dissent indicates that these factors militate in favor of state
law.' If FIRREA's language and purpose do not allow application of
state law standards, the Chapman court's application of the internal affairs
doctrine as a bright line rule as opposed to a presumption makes it
impossible for federal regulators to take advantage of a state standard
preserved by FIRREA's savings clause and, therefore, removes a state's
power to regulate failed federal institutions.
V. CONCLUSION
Under the gross negligence standard established in Chapman, FIRREA
favors directors of federally chartered financial institutions doing business
in states permitting actions for simple negligence. While Congress designed
FIRREA to empower those seeking redress, Congress' failure to announce
that FIRREA applies equally to both state and federally chartered
institutions allowed the Chapman court to make it harder to hold those
potentially responsible for the institution's failure accountable. In time,
frustrated congressional intent will prompt clarification of FIRREA's
140. Using FIRREA to attract banks to adopt federal charters appears inconsistent with Congress'
express decision in § 1821(k) to save state law causes of action, see supra notes 42-60, and therefore,
the states' power to regulate. See also 135 CONG. REc. S4278-4279 (daily ed. April 19, 1989)
(expressing federalism concerns and caution about disrupting state law with the enactment of FIRREA).
141. For a discussion of the internal affairs doctrine and how the Chapman court applied the
doctrine, see supra notes 89-100, 104-07 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 104-07 and accompanying text.
143. See Chapman, 29 F.3d at 1125 (Posner, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Judge Posner explained
the court's holding in terms that illustrate the majority's preference for federal regulation over state
regulation despite the savings clause of § 1821(k). Id. Posner stated that:
[tioday we hold that, despite the saving clause, state law is inapplicable. . . , because disputes
involving the internal affairs of a corporation, including the duties of directors to their
shareholders (in whose shoes the RTC stands), are governed by the law of the chartering
jurisdiction, in this case the federal government, and the applicable law of that jurisdiction
is [the gross negligence standard set out in] § 1821(k).
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application to federally chartered institutions. Until such clarification, the
Seventh Circuit has increased the burden on federal regulators regulating
failed federal financial institutions located in simple negligence states while
concomitantly decreasing a state's power to regulate the operations of
federally chartered institutions operating within its borders.
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